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Introduction 
Many of the new democracies that emerged after the end of the East-West confrontation have 
successfully sustained key democratic institutions but continue to be marred by problems of the 
rule of law, democratic accountability and public disaffection.[1] Authoritarian regimes in the Arab 
world and in Central, East and South-East Asia have demonstrated a remarkable resilience. 
Externally imposed regime changes in Afghanistan and Iraq have brought democratic elections 
and constitutions while major political forces and social groups in these countries lack a 
consensus over the scope and nature of democracy and the state. These developments suggest 
that it is relatively easy to accomplish democratic elections and to prevent new democracies from 
falling back into openly authoritarian regimes. But democratization may become stalled and new 
democracies are susceptible against the erosion of their normative and substantive content.  
The apparent persistence of defective democracies has shifted the attention of scholars from 
studying the causes of regime change and regime consolidation to exploring the quality and 
performance of democracy.[2] Building upon this paradigm shift, the present paper examines the 
impact institutional choices are likely to have on the defect patterns of democracy. We assume, 
firstly, that the persistence of democratic defects calls for accumulating a more robust knowledge 
about the effects changes of given institutional settings, such as the electoral rules, system of 
government, executive or administration will have on these defects. Secondly, we assume that 
the relatively well-charted effects of institutional engineering in consolidated democracies of high-
income industrialized countries can not be simply taken for granted in countries characterized by 
persistent defects of democracy.  
The paper starts by exploring the defects of 50 democracies on the basis of data produced by the 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), a global assessment of the management of democratic 
and economic reforms. How these defects are affected by key institutional reforms is discussed in 
the following section. We focus on proportional electoral rules, a parliamentary system of 
government, a more powerful executive and a decentralized public administration. We consider 
formal institutions because institutional changes are more directly linked to political action and 
may be achieved easier than changes of cultural patterns, social or economic structures. All four 
reforms represent major topics in contemporary scholarly debates about democratization and 
comparative politics. 
Defects of Democracy 
What are the main defects of democracy? To explore this question, we study a sample of 50 
defective democracies in seven regions of the world. Based upon the Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index, we select all countries that hold free and fair elections and that are 
characterized by a minimum of constitutional checks and balances (71), except for 20 countries 
that can be considered as consolidated or nearly consolidated constitutional democracies.[3] Our 
sample includes 16 African, six South and Southeast Asian, 15 Latin American and Caribbean, 
nine Southeast and East European countries as well as Lebanon, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea 
and Turkey.  
A comparison of the disaggregated democracy ratings for these countries shows that their 
representative structures, rule of law and state capacity are considered most problematic (see 
Figure 1). The electoral process and the exercise of political participation rights are, in contrast, 
rated more positively. The stability of democratic institutions is also evaluated positively in 
absolute terms, but is a component of democracy where defective democracies perform much 
weaker than consolidated democracies. Political corruption, the lack of an independent judiciary, 
the weakness of civic self-organization, weakly developed networks of interest associations, 
feeble party systems, an insufficient state infrastructure and a contested state monopoly on the 
use of force are seen as the seven most salient deficiencies in defective democracies, in 
comparison with other elements of democracy and if the mean scores for 20 consolidated 
democracies are taken as benchmarks (see Annex). 
Figure 1: Differences between defective democracies and consolidated democracies/BTI 
maxima 
 
Source: BTI 2006. Difference between average ratings for 50 defective democracies and 20 
consolidated democracies (“relative gap”) and best possible BTI ratings (“absolute gap”).  
Colombia, Guatemala, Lebanon, Moldova, Papua New Guinea, Russia and Sri Lanka are 
classified as most defective, whereas Argentina, Benin, India, Mexico, Macedonia and Panama 
constitute the least defective democracies. This wide range of countries indicates that the degree 
of defectiveness varies strongly across regions. If the regional mean scores are compared, 
Russia and the East European/Caucasian member states of the Community of Independent 
States (CIS) are classified as most defective, while four Southeast European democracies show 
the least deficiencies.  
Corruption and, in particular, the inclination of public officeholders to abuse their position to 
further their private interests constitute severe problems in all regions of the world. Regarding 
other major deficiencies, a number of interregional differences are revealed by the BTI figures. An 
instable and insufficiently representative party system is most characteristic for Asia and the CIS 
region including Mongolia. The latter region has the most weakly developed structures of civic 
self-organization and interest representation, which seems to be associated with serious 
violations of the freedom of media and weak horizontal accountability mechanisms. Defective 
democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean are characterized by relatively severe problems 
with the popular acceptance of democratic norms and frequent infringements of civil liberties. 
Religious authorities have only very limited political influence and democratic elections are held 
largely without restraints in this region. The South East and South Asian democracies of our 
sample are characterized by weak intermediary organizations, disrespect for the rights of ethnic 
and religious minorities and a relatively salient political role of churches and religious dogmas, 
while their judicial systems are considered as comparatively independent.  
The Central and West African democracies suffer mostly from fragile state and administrative 
infrastructures, but seem to be able to rely on a broad and strong popular consensus about 
democratic norms. This consensus is much weaker in Eastern and Southern Africa which is also 
reflected in the weaker acceptance of democratic institutions among relevant political actors and 
graver conflicts between democratic institutions as well as certain restrictions to free elections. 
The four defective democracies in Southeastern Europe are characterized by ethno-political 
conflicts, but perform fairly well with respect to participation and administrative capacity.  
The state of development of democracy in our 50 defective democracies is not correlated with 
economic wealth, manifested as gross national income per capita at purchasing power parities 
(see Figure 2). This means that the quality of democracy does not depend on economic 
prosperity. Indeed, the average quality of democracy in the 23 countries with a per capita income 
of less than 3,000 USD is rated higher than in the 13 countries with income levels between 3,000 
and 6,000 USD. However, there is a significant correlation between economic wealth and the 
ability to ensure a working administration throughout the territory. This indicates the particular 
difficulties low income countries face in establishing an operational administrative infrastructure. 
Figure 2: State of democracy and economic development in 50 defective democracies 
 The seven major deficiencies—corruption, insufficiently independent courts, weak civic self-
organization, feeble interest associations and party systems, lacking administrative infrastructure 
and a contested state monopoly on power—are manifestations of three distinct defect syndromes 
that can be identified by a principal component analysis. The analysis shows that 73 percent of 
the variance in the configuration of the seven deficiencies can be explained by three underlying 
components (see Annex).  
In countries where the state can not fully exercise its monopoly on the use of force, there are also 
frequent problems with sustaining a basic administrative infrastructure throughout the territory 
and with the stability of the party system. This defect syndrome may be characterized as state 
weakness and can be observed particularly in Colombia, Georgia, Lebanon, Mali, Moldova, 
Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Uganda.  
If the judiciary is subordinated to political authorities or restricted by functional deficits, one can 
also observe a higher likelihood of public officeholders that abuse their positions and escape 
prosecution. This syndrome may be labeled as unaccountability. Countries where this defect is 
particularly salient are Armenia, Burkina Faso, Ecuador, Lebanon, Moldova, Nicaragua, Paraguay, 
Sierra Leone and Venezuela.  
A lack of civic self-organization is frequently accompanied by weakly developed networks of 
interest associations and an unstable party system that does not effectively articulate and 
aggregate societal interests. This defect syndrome may be dubbed representation weakness and 
is most visible in Bosnia, Georgia, Guatemala, Madagascar, Malawi, Moldova and the Russian 
Federation. 
Choices for Institutional Reform 
This section discusses institutional choices to address state weakness, unaccountability and 
representation weakness. We ask whether a proportional electoral system, a parliamentary 
system of government, a more powerful executive and a more decentralized public administration 
are likely to overcome the defects of democracy observed in the previous section. 
Increasing electoral proportionality  
A first option to address democratic weaknesses is the choice of the electoral system as a set of 
rules generating the relevant political forces. Traditionally, the scholarly discussion has revolved 
around the juxtaposition of majoritarian versus proportional electoral systems, while in reality 
mixed systems prevail. Normative approaches to the study of electoral systems characterize the 
logics of the two systems in an ideal type fashion.[4] Majoritarian systems are seen to provide a 
more efficient and stable political process as they avoid party fragmentation, lead to a 
concentration of parties approximating a two-party-system, foster stable governments during their 
terms of office, but also increase the probability of more frequent changes between political 
alternatives. Proportional representation systems, in contrast, provide for a greater representation 
of all societal interests, avoid artificial majorities, induce a climate of compromise and negotiation 
and are more sensitive to changes in society and to emerging issues. To strengthen or 
consolidate democracy, this ideal-type view suggests a trade-off between effectiveness on the 
one hand and the extensive recognition of (individual or group) preferences on the other.  
Empirical research draws a more differentiated picture of the causes and effects of electoral 
systems. Not only are there so many mixed forms of electoral systems that they cannot be 
assessed as either majoritarian or proportional. It is also not easy to evaluate the effects of 
electoral systems in general terms, given that they are highly sensitive to the context in which 
such systems are embedded (e.g. the institutional environment, the heterogeneity of society, the 
structure of cleavages, the fragmentation and/or institutionalization of the party system, the 
political culture etc.). Finally, electoral systems tend to confirm the societal structures and political 
conditions under which they have been chosen, reflecting the extant social and political reality. 
Thus it depends on the respective contexts and conditions if democratic political stability is to be 
achieved by moving towards a majoritarian or by proportional electoral systems.  
From both approaches we can conclude that there is no a priori preferable choice which could be 
applied uniformly. However, this conclusion needs to be qualified for the three main defects of 
democracies—state weakness, unaccountability and representation weakness. The choice of an 
electoral system is most influential for the quality of representation structures.  
Increasing proportionality has become a prominent proposal to solve problems of heterogeneous 
societies. As majoritarian systems tend to ignore structural minorities, proportional representation 
might help to alleviate conflict and avoid centrifugal tendencies. However, this need not be 
inevitable, as it also depends on the resilience of the existing party system and its ability to 
integrate minorities. Majoritarian systems can provide incentives for parties to bridge ethnic or 
other cleavages if votes from different segments of society are needed to attain a majority.[5] As 
a rule one can formulate that if (1) societal heterogeneity has become a political salient issue and 
(2) the (majoritarian) electoral system is an impediment for confl ict resolution, it is preferable to 
increase electoral proportionality in order to integrate the centrifugal forces. This may also 
mitigate the problem of state weakness, if the state has lacked legitimacy among the formerly 
underrepresented population. However, (more) proportional representation seems to be only one 
part of the solution. Especially in ethnically divided societies the formation of new parties does not 
necessarily lead to a politics of accommodation, but might also reinforce ethnic confrontation. 
Additional safeguards are required, such as a veto rights, grand coalitions or guarantees of 
segmental autonomy—the components of consociational democracy.[6]  
On the other hand, increasing proportionality is by no means a uniformly applicable solution to 
representation problems. Including a wider spectrum of preferences by increasing opportunities of 
representation also increases the fragmentation of the party system. Party fragmentation, 
however, represents one of the core problems of many young democracies as it leads to 
uncertain majorities and political instability. In those cases, the solution for representation 
problems may even be a weakening of proportionality in order to enhance stability, for example 
by introducing an eligibility threshold for parliamentary representation.  
In sum, the introduction of a (more) proportional electoral system is strongly dependent on the 
societal context and the institutional environment in which it is embedded. Like any change of the 
electoral system it is not so much a question of technical improvements to further inclusiveness 
but a question of power. Typically, profound changes of electoral rule occur either during a 
transition from authoritarian rule itself or in situations of crisis, for example when strong ethnic 
minorities claim representation. The abovementioned trade-off between efficiency and 
inclusiveness thus becomes part of the power game itself.  
The literature on electoral systems does not provide a clear lesson about the relationship of 
electoral systems and unaccountability. A higher number of party players and hence a greater 
uncertainty in coalition building may represent a more favorable incentive structure for 
establishing accountability mechanisms, above all an independent judiciary.[7] However, as 
Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman argue, proportional representation systems also seem to be more 
susceptible to corrupt political rent-seeking than majoritarian systems, especially in combination 
with presidentialism.[8] 
Parliamentarization of government  
As a second option to overcome key defects of democracies, we consider the change from a 
presidential to a (more) parliamentary system of government. Discussions about the role of 
presidential systems for democratic consolidation surface time and again. The main focus of this 
long debate in democratization research has been whether parliamentary or presidential systems 
of government are more supportive for the consolidation of democracy.[9] Parliamentarism can 
be defined as the form of democracy “in which the executive authority emerges from, and is 
responsible to, legislative authority.”[10] In contrast, presidentialism is a system where executive 
and legislature are elected separately and where neither branch can act to shorten the term of the 
other.[11] Systems where cabinets are accountable to parliament and a popularly elected 
president are classified as mixed systems (presidential-parliamentary, premier-presidential, and 
semi-presidential).  
Most researchers agree that presidential systems are less capable of solving problems than 
parliamentary systems because they divide authority between the executive and the legislative, 
cause legislative gridlock, support populism, generate myopic, ad hoc policies and politicize 
controversial issues.[12] As presidential systems separate parliamentary deputies and parties 
from the executive, legislators become less interested in providing national policy than in 
parliamentary systems.[13] Parliamentary systems also provide better conditions than semi-
presidential systems for a successful democratization and the consolidation of democracy.[14] 
The reason given in Rüb’s study is, first, that the bipolar executives characterizing semi-
presidential systems are more prone to populist politics and ethno-nationalist mobilization than 
the executives of parliamentary systems. Second, bipolar executives can not compensate the 
weaknesses of a fragmented or polarized party system. Presidential and also semi-presidential 
systems thus pose additional difficulties for a reform management and weaken the ability of a 
political leadership to commit itself to reform policies and to implement them against political 
resistance.  
In sum, the argument is that presidential systems in emerging democracies have a detrimental 
effect on their stability. The BTI data also suggest a correlation between weak democracies and 
the adopted system of government. As Table 1 shows, presidential systems are more frequent 
among defective democracies, while most consolidated democracies are parliamentary systems. 
Table 1 : Presidential and parliamentary systems of government in democracies 
   Consolidated 
OECD 








Parliamentary  18  13  12 (27.9%)  43  
Presidential  2  3  27 (84.4%)  32  
Semi-
presidential  
4  4  12 (60.0%)  20  
Concerning the prospects of democratic consolidation, the above-mentioned deficiencies suggest 
that presidential systems tend to be dominated by the logic of confrontation and conflict. 
Conversely, parliamentary systems seem to be dominated by the logic of coalition and consensus 
building. However, empirical research on presidential systems shows that this general 
observation has to be attenuated by observing the context factors that support these negative 
tendencies. The question frequently is which type of institutional structure forms the government 
system as a whole. Especially the overall weaknesses of democratic institutions including the 
judiciary and the state apparatus are more likely if there is no tradition of institution building as in 
Chile, Uruguay, Taiwan or South Korea.  
The context of actor constellations, cultural traditions and institutional conditions determines how 
a system of government affects reform policies.[15] One approach to structure the ambiguous 
policy effect of different systems of government is to distinguish between policy decisiveness (i.e. 
the ability to make policy decisions) and policy resoluteness (i.e. the ability to commit to 
established policy decisions).[16] Presidential systems can be expected to be more resolute and 
less decisive than parliamentary systems since a powerful president represents an additional veto 
actor whose support is required to change the status quo. Whether this is indeed the case, 
depends on other features of the institutional arrangement. Concurrent presidential and legislative 
elections, a party-centered electoral formula, a unicameral assembly elected congruently with the 
president’ constituency, and full renewal of all legislative seats at each election support the 
decisiveness and reduce the resoluteness of policy-making. Conversely, non-concurrent electoral 
cycles, staggered assembly elections, candidate-centered electoral formulas and incongruence 
between president’s and parliament’s constituency support resolute, but indecisive policy-
making.[17]  
How, then, can parliamentary systems help overcoming the above-mentioned defect syndromes? 
The effect of the system of government on state weakness is more an indirect one. As presidents 
in new democracies are seen as the embodiment of the state, a leadership or government crisis 
deriving from the logic of confrontation may lead to a state crisis. This delays the development of 
stable state structures including the monopoly on the use of force, as the military and/or the 
police have to be involved in crises which have their origin in government crises. Equally 
important is the impact on public administration as a subsystem organized according to 
professional standards and legal-bureaucratic rationality. Presidential systems with their logic of 
‘elected kings’ and the principle of ‘winner takes all’ frequently lead to a pronounced clientelism in 
the civil service. Parliamentary systems on the other hand, though they often share a clientelist 
legacy, are more dependent on the continuity of the state administration which favors a more 
stable and professionalized administration.  
Concerning unaccountability, i.e. the weakness of the judiciary as an independent branch of 
power and the problem of political corruption, parliamentary systems also seem to have 
advantages in overcoming or at least not aggravating these defects. The subordination of the 
judiciary in most defective democracies, while surely having its roots also in the judicial culture, is 
more accentuated in presidential democracies. This subordination is the outflow of the logic of 
confrontation and the logic of competing legitimacies between executive and legislative. As the 
judiciary is a ‘dependent’ power with respect to its legitimization, executive and legislative tend to 
conceive the judicial system as just another political battlefield. In parliamentary systems, on the 
other hand, the incentive structure for unaccountability is less pronounced. Except for majoritarian 
systems with one party domination, the ongoing competition for power and the possibility of 
changing coalitions leads to a perception of ‘iterated games’ and extends the time horizon of 
political actors. More reliable mutual expectations improve the likelihood of stable institutions 
including a functioning judicial system to ensure accountability.  
The most positive effects of parliamentary systems for strengthening democracy are to be 
expected in the party system, with further effects for the whole representation structure including 
the functional interest groups and civil society. As parliamentary systems require stable party 
structures for the generation of political options, political leadership, and seizing power, their 
strategic position is quite different from the party players in presidential systems. In contrast with 
presidential systems, parties have to focus more on programmatic alternatives than on the 
personal virtues of individual leaders and their often erratic and ephemeral preferences. Parties 
also have to seek a closer connection to the citizens’ preferences in order to present eligible 
alternatives. This in turn requires closer links to interest groups and civil society and induces a 
more vibrant representation system. This does not mean that the system of government is the 
only determinant of functioning party systems. Other factors may neutralize or transform a 
destabilizing impact of the system of government, as indicated by the presidential democracies in 
Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Taiwan and South Korea which have successfully nurtured stable 
party systems. However, to overcome weak representation structures, parliamentary government 
provides more appropriate incentives than presidentialism.  
Though the debate on presidentialism is still ongoing, parliamentary systems seem to have 
comparative advantages vis-à-vis presidential systems to deepen democratic development. 
Therefore, introducing parliamentary models should be a priority strategy particularly during a 
transition from authoritarian to democratic rule. If the political conditions allow, existing 
presidential systems should be transformed into parliamentary systems. However, as the 
example of Latin America shows, if presidentialism is deeply rooted in the political culture or in 
the collective imaginary, it may take a long way to change the system of government. As an 
alternative, existing presidential systems could be strengthened by developing a “culture” of 
building and respecting institutions as well as professionalizing their party systems. This way, 
however, is a long one too. 
Empowering Executives  
A third option to address democratic defects is to strengthen the power of governments. This can 
be done by reducing the number of constitutional and partisan veto players and by weakening 
their veto powers. Restricting the constitutional powers of the president, for example, would 
reduce her or his opportunities to obstruct governmental policy making. Reinforcing the 
majoritarian elements of the electoral system would reduce the fragmentation of parliament and, 
accordingly, the number of parties required to form a parliamentary majority. This could generate 
more cohesive cabinets backed by more secure legislative majorities. In bicameral legislatures, 
the veto power of the second chamber could be weakened or abolished. The thresholds for a 
judicial review of government policies could be increased.  
Empowering reforms could also target the government directly, for example by strengthening its 
agenda-setting and agenda control powers in parliament. The government could be given more 
discretion about organizational, budgetary and personnel matters. Regulations could take the 
form of executive decrees rather than laws. The expert support to ministers and, in particular, the 
prime minister could be improved. Strengthening the prime minister’s position in cabinet would 
enable her/him to better enforce the government’s interest against departmental concerns.  
How do such reforms affect development and democracy? Two main lines of argumentation may 
be distinguished in the literature. The conventional view emphasizes the importance of executive 
authority, autonomy and power for policy reforms and effective governance. This view has been 
substantiated with the case of the East Asian economies that were able to catch up with Western 
industrialized countries because they were led by activist states that channeled export revenues 
into education, research and development spending and coordinated the successive 
technological upgrading of production facilities.[18] Competent states are needed to cope with the 
challenges of globalization, to combat poverty and to meet expectations of their citizens.[19]  
Strong governments are required to overcome the resistance of status quo interests and to act in 
the strategic, long-term interest of a country.[20] Based upon a comparison of policy reforms in 13 
countries, Williamson and Haggard argue that successful reforms are facilitated by a strong base 
of political support, visionary leaders and a coherent economic team with a comprehensive 
program.[21]  
Centralized and unconstrained executive authority is required to initiate economic reforms. “In 
every successful reform effort, politicians delegated decision-making authority to units within the 
government that were insulated from routine bureaucratic processes, from legislative and interest 
group pressures, and even from executive pressure. ...successful policy reform efforts were 
preceded by reforms within the bureaucracy itself, reforms that pried policymaking away from 
existing channels and centralized decision-making processes across relevant agencies.”[22] The 
higher the durability of cabinets, the higher appears the ability of executives to formulate strategic, 
long-term policies and to sustain a problem-solving policy style rather than adapting their policy-
making to the political logic of the electoral cycle.  
In this view, more powerful governments are likely to overcome state weakness since they are 
better equipped to build an administrative infrastructure covering the entire territory and to 
exercise and defend the state’s monopoly on the use of force.  
The alternative line of argumentation in the literature claims that consultation with social actors 
and building broad policy coalitions in society actually strengthens the governing capacity of 
executives. Developmental states in East Asia could successfully modernize because they 
combined internal coherence and external connectedness.[23] Their “embedded autonomy” has 
prevented them from being captured by particularist economic and political elites and from 
becoming predatory states consuming the country’s resources. A more recent study of 35 
emerging democracies has shown that political systems with multiple veto players achieve higher 
levels of the rule of law because in such systems veto players face incentives to refrain from 
collusion.[24]  
The consolidation of economic reform requires the balancing and control of executive authority 
through representative institutions, checks on executive discretion and the delegation of authority 
to independent professional agencies.[25] These mechanisms are needed to sustain reform 
policies, since they broaden the social base of support and reduce policy uncertainty. In this 
perspective, policy reforms are less jeopardized by the losers of economic adjustment than by the 
winners of the first reform stage.[26] Asset stripping enterprise insiders, commercial bankers 
profiting from distorted markets, local officials with monopoly rents and Mafiosi can “stall the 
economy in a partial reform equilibrium that generates concentrated rents for themselves while 
imposing high costs on the rest of society.”[27]  
Institutional devices that increase the accountability of executives, such as more frequent 
elections and shorter executive tenures, improve competition among political actors and thus 
reduce the blockade power of such vested interests. "Institutional configurations that constrain 
executive authority are more likely to yield coherent formulation and implementation of economic 
reforms ...executive capacity, understood here as the capacity to formulate and implement 
coherent reform programs, can be increased by limitations on the unilateral prerogatives of 
executive authority.”[28]  
An enabling function of institutional constraints has also been identified for the internal 
organization of government. Ministerial policy unreliability can be controlled well in collegial 
executives because these executives rely more on internal mechanisms for ensuring that their 
policy proposals are not vetoed.[29] The main reason for this is that cabinet members can be 
assumed to have internalized collegiality norms in the course of their selection and appointment. 
By contrast, in hierarchical executives, political tradeoffs take place outside the executive rather 
than within, and thus internal controls of unreliability will be less effective. Ministers in hierarchical 
governments face stronger incentives to serve their constituency and departmental interests.  
In sum, this literature suggests that constraining executives is the best choice to cope with the 
defect of unaccountability since constraints on executive power limit or prevent the abuse of 
public offices by their incumbents. The literature indicates a certain tradeoff between policies 
addressing state weakness and policies aimed at improving accountability. It can, however, also 
be read as an important qualification to the conventional position in favor of powerful executives. 
Executive power is conceived not only as the capacity to enforce policies but comprises the 
capacity to sustain policies over a longer period. More effective accountability mechanisms may 
thus additionally strengthen executive power which would enable an executive to address state 
weakness even more effectively.  
Neither the conventional nor the alternative argumentation suggest a clear lesson with respect to 
the impact a powerful executive exerts on representation weakness. We therefore conclude that 
empowering executives is a strategy that has little direct effect on the representation structures of 
defective democracies. It should not be applied as a priority strategy if a democracy suffers 
mainly from representation problems. 
Decentralizing Public Administrations  
As a fourth option to address democratic defects, we consider the decentralization of public 
administration. Decentralization can be achieved by transferring powers and resources from the 
central to regional and local levels of government. Democracies usually include institutions of 
local self-government that could be addressees of decentralization. To become effective, the 
transfer of legal competences to municipalities should comprise the provision of appropriate funds 
that enable municipalities to perform their new functions. The literature on public finance 
emphasizes that a decentralization of spending powers should be combined with a 
decentralization of taxing or revenue-raising powers so that the sources of revenues and the 
beneficiaries of expenditures are as congruent as possible.[30]  
Decentralization is often distinguished from de-concentration which is conceived as the transfer of 
powers from central to local units of ministries or state administration. Whereas de-concentration 
implies that the instructing and supervisory powers of central government units are retained, 
decentralization means that central government bodies abandon powers. In most democracies, 
sub-national self-governments perform tasks delegated to them by the central government and 
tasks belonging to their own competences. The central government usually supervises the 
activities of sub-national self-governments more or less closely. A more far-reaching 
decentralization entails the transfer of legislative powers to sub-national levels of government. 
Decentralization may also be achieved by endowing regional levels of government with powers or 
by establishing regional self-government. Such regional units may be involved in the legislative 
process on the national level, rendering the political system a federation.  
How does decentralization affect the main defects of democracy? In the policy-oriented literature, 
decentralization is seen as a key tool for broadening the participation of citizens in policy 
making.[31] More participatory forms of governance can reduce unaccountability since they 
expose government officials and decision making to a more direct scrutiny by local stakeholders 
and the public. As stronger accountability is likely to increase a government’s sensitivity to local 
conditions and needs, democracy will become more responsive. Decentralization may facilitate 
greater political representation for diverse cultural, ethnic and religious groups in decision making. 
As such groups may become numerical majorities or significant political actors in sub-national 
territorial units; they have better chances to determine issues they consider of vital importance for 
their community. As a consequence, representation structures could be strengthened.  
Decentralization can improve government effectiveness since it relieves central government 
bodies from planning and control activities and supports central government ministries in covering 
more local areas with services. This would positively affect the defect of state weakness. In 
addition, decentralization can lead to greater effectiveness by encouraging experimentation and 
learning among local government units. The literature on fiscal decentralization and new public 
management views decentralization as an essential element of more efficient government. Local 
units of government are provided with larger discretion over their budgets, and their performance 
is measured in comparison with the performance of other local units. Because budgetary 
allocations are linked to meeting performance targets, local government units face incentives to 
improve their performance. Moreover, autonomous revenue-raising powers are expected to 
induce local government units to reduce taxes in order to attract investors.  
Thus decentralization appears to be an effective instrument to address all three major defects of 
democracy. It may, however, have problematic consequences for a democracy if it 
institutionalizes local enclaves of authoritarian practice or paves the way for separatist political 
actors.[32] If the local civil society is weak or if cleavages between center and periphery are 
polarized, local political leaders may exploit the decentralization of powers to promote separatism 
or to repress newly generated local minorities. Creating new tiers of government may also entail 
an increase of bureaucracy and additional costs. Moreover, the efficiency gains of 
decentralization may be combined with a widening of regional disparities and a deterioration of 
service quality in less developed areas. These problems and risks may offset the positive impact 
decentralization may exert on state weakness.  
To avoid negative side-effects of decentralization, three key conditions should be fulfilled. First, 
citizens and local stakeholders should be involved in exercising decentralized power. Such 
participation provides forms of accountability that can replace the functions of prefects or central 
government supervisory bodies. Second, decentralization should be organized as a learning 
environment where horizontal learning among decentralized units and the horizontal diffusion of 
best practices are supported. Third, states should develop clear legal rules and limits for sub-
national levels of government that protect self-governing rights and sanction the abuse of these 
rights. Such rules should also regulate the allocation of financial support to local government 
bodies and clarify how the central government will assist local government units with financial 
problems. 
Conclusion 
Our empirical inquiry into the defects of democracy has shown that key defects exist both on the 
input and output side of the political system, undermining its input legitimacy as well as its output 
legitimacy. While the weakness of representation structures linking society with the political 
system vitiates the input legitimacy of new democracies, the weakness of state administration, 
often related to a contested state monopoly of power, harms the output legitimacy of democracies. 
Unaccountability, the third major, empirically observable defect of democracy, affects both 
sources of democratic legitimacy since it weakens the power of public interest institutions to hold 
officials accountable and enables public officeholders to abuse their position. Of the four 
institutional choices discussed in the present paper, two address input and, respectively, output 
deficits directly (see Table 2).  
Table 2 : Defects of democracy and effects of institutional choices  
   Proportional 









State weakness  o  +  +  o  
Unaccountability  o  +  -  +  
Representation 
weakness  
+  +  o  +  
Synthesizing the detailed discussion in the second section, Table 2 denotes the effects of 
institutional choices for democratic defects identified on the basis of the BTI assessments. 
Moving towards a proportional electoral system may improve the representativeness of the party 
system and thus the input quality of democracy, if care is taken to prevent party fragmentation. 
However, the defects of unaccountability or state weakness are not affected in a clearly negative 
or positive fashion an increase of electoral proportionality.  
Strengthening the executive constitutes a reform that aims at improving the output quality of 
democracy and is likely to overcome state weakness. This effect rests on improvements of the 
steering capability of executives. Empowering an executive is, however, likely to weaken the 
accountability of government and does not have a clearly negative or positive effect on 
representation weakness.  
Parliamentarizing the system of government and decentralizing public administration are two 
institutional reforms that affect both output and input defects of democracy. It is perhaps not 
surprising that these two reforms are likely to have the most positive effects on our defect 
patterns, since they can be seen as integral or composite approaches to cope with democratic 
defects. Taken together, our four reform strategies represent a differentiated menu of tools to 
combat defect patterns in democracies. While the defects may occur together, one can also 
pursue several institutional reform strategies in parallel. Such an approach is particularly 
expedient if one reform tends to reinforce or enhance the impact of another reform.  
However, certain reforms may also limit or thwart the impact of other reforms. For example, 
endowing the executive with more powers seems to be incompatible with the decentralization of 
governmental powers. Whereas the former reform prioritizes steering capability, the latter reform 
improves the incentives for consensus building. Increasing electoral proportionality tends to 
weaken executive power as governments are likely to consist of party coalitions that are more 
dependent on the power constellation in parliament than the single-party majority governments 
typically generated by majoritarian electoral formulas.  
Establishing a parliamentary system of government can be seen as a priority strategy as it is 
likely to influence all three major defects of democracy positively. It could be combined with a 
strategy to increase executive power in order to address problems of state weakness that are 
particularly wide-spread in low-income countries. Where presidential systems are embedded in 
the national political culture and thus difficult to change, parliamentarization could be linked with 
decentralization by establishing parliamentary models on the regional level. This would not only 
avoid local authoritarian enclaves but could also be used to initiate learning processes and 
cultural changes.  
We have to keep in mind, however, that such institutional choices represent only one—and 
probably a relatively easily to manipulate one—leverage point to improve the quality of defective 
democracies. Defects do not only stick to institutional arrangements but are embedded in 
socioeconomic conditions, societal structure, cultural predispositions and international 
constellations. An institutional engineering that ignores this context could create artifacts hiding 
informal practices rather than institutions that regulate behavior and shape expectations.  
(Click here to view Table 3: BTI democracy assessment—mean scores by region and by type of 
democracy.) 






weakness”  “unaccountability”  
“representation 
weakness”  
State monopoly on force  .897  .063  -.054  
Working administration  .849  .197  .053  
Independent judiciary  .051  .888  .055  
No abuse of office  .111  .883  .042  
Party system  .535  -.176  .504  
Interest groups  .005  .035  .848  
Self-organization  .014  .115  .814  
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. Rotation converged in 5 iterations. 
Table 5: Patterns of democratic defects 
      State weakness  
      Low  high  
      Unaccountability  Unaccountability  
      Low  high  low  high  
Representation 
weakness  



















































Countries are classified according to whether they attain positive (low) or negative (high) factor 
scores for the three components underlying the seven major deficiencies of democracies, as 
identified by the BTI 2006. Note that “low” and “high” are relative classifiers and neglect 
considerable intra-group differences.  
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